

THE ROLE OF TRUST IN THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

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ABSTRACT: *The paper relies on a unique international comparative study focusing on the political integration of immigrants in large European cities. The study analysed the degree of interest in politics, levels of political knowledge and political participation among immigrants and examined the perceived trust in institutions of the relevant home and host countries and people in general. In this analysis we begin by exploring a few general questions on trust and some that apply specifically to the situation of migrants. We then consider the degree of trust potential across various migrant groups, how the host country and the microclimate of the residential area affect the level of trust, and how specific ethnic backgrounds influence trust. We attempt to establish different types of trust concerning the general trust in people, institutions and the faith in one's own ethnic group. Finally, we consider how and whether trust as capital serves successful integration and settling down.*

INTRODUCTION

Trust is a social psychological mechanism that positively influences social behaviour and that acts as a connection between personal motivations and creeds on the one hand and desired organizational and societal goals on the other. The opposite of trust is *suspicion*, which distances and questions the reciprocal relationship between the individual and society (or, simply put, “others”), and which psychologically brings doubt into the meaning and success of the actor's actions (Festinger 1957). Trust and suspicion manifest themselves as a social phenomenon connected to the individual. Trust is a kind of social capital³ that positively influences the individual's chances for social success, while

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³ Beyond the Marxist use of the term ‘capital’, there are a growing number of similar terms used to explain economic and social relations, including the relation system of individuals (social capital), inherited and acquired knowledge (cultural capital and habits), influence potential and power position (political capital). These kinds of capital work separately and in conjunction to define the social position of the individual. The types of capital and the conversion mechanisms between them largely define the methods and limits of attaining

suspicion can obstruct such success. Further, on the social level, trust is one of the most important elements of social integration, while the lack of trust leads to social disintegration and delegitimization of the social system (Misztral 1996).

The question of trust has become a popular topic in various social sciences over the past few decades: the birth of theories of social trust has led to numerous research projects in economics, political science, sociology and social psychology, covering topics like the economic behaviour of individuals, consumer behaviour, political participation and legitimacy and the organization of community relations. Researchers have separately examined the characteristics of manifestations of trust and its potential strength in complete societies as well as in certain social groups. Surprisingly, there are hardly any analyses on the ethnic-cultural aspects of trust and its role in the everyday life of religious, ethnic or migrant groups.⁴ This holds despite the fact that trust plays a special role in the social relations of immigrants, the norms and mechanisms that guide their coexistence with the majority, their social and cultural integration, personal success, and the ability of the majority to accept migrants and their otherness.⁵

The goal of this analysis is to use the tools of empirical sociology to examine the role of trust in a unique social situation: the settling down of immigrants and the process of integration. The paper relies on a unique international comparative study focusing on the political integration of immigrants in large European cities.⁶ The study covered the degree of interest in politics, political knowledge and political participation among immigrants and examined the perceived trust in the institutions of the relevant home and host countries and people in general.

In this analysis we begin by exploring a few general questions on trust and some that apply specifically to the situation of migrants. We then consider the degree of trust potential across various migrant groups, how the host country and the microclimate of the residential area affect the level of trust, and how specific ethnic backgrounds influence trust. We attempt to establish different types of trust concerning the general trust in people, institutions and the faith in one's own ethnic group. Finally, we consider how trust as capital serves successful immigration and settlement.

status in given societies. Individual freedom and opportunity lies in choosing the optimal capital acquirement and conversion mechanisms (Coleman 1989; Bourdieu 1977).

⁴ As an exception: Victor Nee and Jimmy Sanders (Nee 2001).

⁵ Naturally if we widen the concept of trust then we cannot neglect the robust social science tradition that has long dealt with characteristic mechanisms between minorities and majorities (ethnic minority categorisation, stereotyping, social distance, prejudices, discrimination, racism). Theories using a narrower reading of trust have not produced literature that links trust and the above-listed phenomena.

⁶ The investigated cities included: Madrid, Barcelona, London, Lyon, Milan, Zurich, Geneva and Budapest. For further information please refer to the project's website: <http://www.um.es/localmultidem/>

ON TRUST

The examination of the question of trust is relatively new in sociology. As sociologists have begun to move from examining grand social relations, the behaviour of institutions and social groups toward more hidden aspects of human relations, the question of trust has gained in importance. Though researchers have still not agreed on an exact definition, there is a wide consensus on the significance of trust in large-scale societies and in smaller groups. There are some who interpret trust as a personal characteristic and a psychological phenomenon. Others stress the value component in trust and emphasize the moral aspect (Uslaner 2002). The most common approach understands trust as a social „good” which functions as a capital asset that can be mobilized by the individual, and which is an important precondition or tool for effective social cooperation (Gambetta 1988). Macro-level approaches treat trust as a glue serving the moral integration of society (Elster 1989).

Behind the various definitions three quite divergent interpretative options can be formulated. The first is motivated by theories focusing on relations between people and economic, social, and cultural exchange activities that drive effective interest assertion mechanisms. This approach sees trust as central element in rational behaviour and decision-making, reciprocity and cooperation among individuals or groups, the establishment and acceptance of rules, and the belief that the other party will comply with the rules. On the level of individuals and interpersonal relations trust increases the predictability of actions, minimizes risk, strengthens solidarity with others, and provides participants with milieus of security, satisfaction and friendship (Hardin 2002). On the macro level, this kind of trust (or trust in this interpretative framework) makes the functioning of social systems predictable, relies on the principle of reciprocity in establishing opportunities for participating in public decisions, deepens the legitimacy of the system, and creates faith in all areas of life. On the macro level trust is a type of commodity, something that can and ought to be acquired by individuals and collectives (private and public good), and a social capital which significantly assists individuals in attaining success.

Another interpretation stresses trust as a cognitive form. In this reading behavioural elements learned through socialization are responsible for the presence (or absence) of trust. Trust in others is not necessarily a concrete goal, and it is not always dependent on external conditions. This type of trust is a kind of belief in other people, which is to a degree a characteristic of the individual personality, part of a person's disposition, and is manifest in a generally positive and optimistic approach to others, or may become an everyday behaviour pattern. A different but related theory posits that consciousness of belonging to

one's own group and the differentiation from other groups lead to trust forming the foundation of personal identity. In this reading trust is an important part of our social identity and helps establishing harmony with group membership.

The third possible interpretation of trust emphasises moral aspects. The basis of this is *generalised trust*⁷, displayed toward not individuals but toward entire communities (and all their members) or institutions, whereby these groups and institutions are expected to behave in predictable and socially acceptable ways. If these expectations have a normative content then generalized trust will take the form of moral trust. According to the normative interpretation trust links the individual to his/her group morally, ensures the acceptance of social prestige, and generally generates widely accepted value fields which serve as a foundation for social coexistence. Erik Uslaner defines two rather different types of trust. One is called general or moral trust while the other is described as partial or strategic trust. "Trust in other people is based upon a fundamentally ethical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values" (Uslaner 2004: 2) The moral trust approach posits that individuals not only have to cooperate with each another but they also have to perceive each other as credible and should have feelings of mutual moral obligation. According to Uslaner the culture of trust assumes fundamental egalitarianism and is paired with the belief that we should pursue not only our own interests but should attempt to help others as well. Moral trust is characterised by a strengthening function in which it is derived from the individual's moral obligation. Trust can be directed toward institutions, individuals or groups, without expecting reciprocity. Moral trust is stable and is characterized by permanence, unlike partial trust.⁸ Moral trust ensures acceptance of societal rules and institutions and as such is a necessary condition for social integration (Uslander 2004).⁹

The above approaches to trust see the social role of trust differently, though they are the same in the fact that they consider the phenomenon from the point of view of the individual embedded into society or from the perspective of the social system as a whole. But what happens when we seek the presence of trust in the periphery of society, when we examine the presence of trust in terms of social relations between minorities and majorities? How do we interpret situations where an individual moves between cultures and homes? Does trust ap-

⁷ This term originates from the English-language literature.

⁸ Moral trust (or lack thereof) permeating society and general honesty (or suspicion) are definitive organizing principles of social integration that operate meaningful mechanisms of choice concerning cultural patterns and values. For this reason moral trust or lack thereof can only change slowly over time and drastic events have to occur for such positions to change. In contrast trust capital that assists coexistence and cooperation is quite unstable: any negative event affecting us can destroy the trust we held earlier.

⁹ According to Uslaner, strategic trust works entirely differently. This form of trust always assumes two different parties and increases effective cooperation between the parties. Strategic trust is always directed toward concrete individuals and assumes reciprocity.

pear in this situation, and which of our earlier instrumentalist, moral and cognitive approaches deepen (and which obstruct or weaken) trust? In a typical situation an immigrant is short of most of the resources that are necessary for success and personal security. Thus trust can become his/her only accessible and “inexhaustible” type of capital. As Victor Nee and Jimmy Sanders established regarding trust in ethnic relations, this kind of social capital is often more important in the social adaptation of immigrants than other kinds of capitals, whether these be networks of relationships, material resources, language, cultural capital or even positions of political power (Nee and Sanders 2001). It is generally true that in the case of immigrants the role of human resources (language, skills, networks, social norms and qualifications) increases, given that the transfer of material goods during migration is limited. For newly arrived immigrants, several immediate problems arise (legalisation of residence, contacts with authorities, insurance, housing, employment, education of children etc.) and trust as capital can help solving difficulties arising from lack of experience, information and various resources.¹⁰

Trust as capital can be a special “asset” for a migrant. However, it is possible that migrants marginalised in the host society, with a status of a cultural stranger, will be suspicious or will not be able to secure the trust of others toward themselves. Trust in others can play various roles in relationships: on the one hand it can play a *bonding* role within very different, more or less closed communities (such trust networks keep together families, religious groups or groups based on common ethnic origin). On the other hand it can play a *bridging* role among individuals, groups and cultures that are distant from one another. Third, trust can bring about *linking* among groups and individuals that occupy different positions in social hierarchies (Hardin 2002; Tóth 2005).

In the life of an immigrant the linking and bridging roles of trust are of the greatest significance. Physical distance from the country of origin weakens (or completely destroys) traditional social networks (family, extended family, friends, colleagues etc.) that may act as a safety net. It is not surprising that newly arrived immigrants set up links to their ethnic-national diasporas, where they will feel a common destiny and look for a source of assistance.¹¹ This is due not only to the common recent experience of migration but also to language, ethnic identity, or perhaps religious connections and the sense of a common culture and past. Trust based on ethnic origin builds tight bonds along the lines of ancestry and common culture: ethnically based trust among group

¹⁰ The research data introduced later in this paper shows that newly arrived immigrants have much more trust in the institutions of the host country than those who have lived for a long time in the host country.

¹¹ Our data shows that the networks of newly arrived immigrants are more closed. The longer an immigrant lives in a country, the higher the chance that friendship circles will expand beyond fellow ethnics.

members demands a high degree of commitment, while granting such trust to other ethnic groups may be grounds for suspicion. Ethnic trust in the life of an immigrant is of a dual nature: on one hand relationships based on ethnic trust help protect the immigrant's cultural self-image and identity in a socio-cultural environment that is foreign to him/her, all the while for the migrant community ethnic trust is an important tool for cohesion. On the other hand, according to the literature, this kind of trust often results in ethnic isolation, segregation, the formation of cliques and obstructs the successful social integration of the immigrant. This in turn can strengthen intolerance and exclusion on the part of the majority toward the minority (Uslaner 2004).

Bonding type trust must be accompanied by bridging trust in the life of an immigrant. This is a condition for successful social integration and it will influence the degree to which the immigrant can make him/herself accepted by the majority and to which the original personal goals of migration can be attained. Should bridging trust – which bridges the host and the hosted – be damaged or not be built up at all then the immigrant's only option for survival is ethnic segregation and self-ghettoisation.

Trust among migrants can of course also be related to Uslaner's concept of dual trust. On one hand we can speak about generalised or moral trust, which comes to light in the relationship with the host country and which shows the degree to which the migrant trusts the host country's institutions, authorities and citizens. On the other hand a potential lack of trust can encourage the building of partial or strategic trust, especially toward co-ethnics sharing the plight of migration, toward members of his/her own network and toward the representatives of civic associations assisting migrants (with whom a personal relationship has been established and where assistance can be sought).

THE LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG IMMIGRANTS

Having considered the theoretical aspects of trust, we now turn to the results of an international empirical study, in order to understand the role of trust among immigrants

The research project originally covered six countries, eight cities and sixteen migrant groups. The subsamples provided approximately 300 subjects.¹²

¹² The migrant groups across various cities naturally varied along demographic parameters. It is generally true that migration is more common in younger generations. Migrants were on average ten years younger (on average 39 years old) than the host population in all the countries. An exception to this was Italians living in Switzerland, among whom almost three-quarters were older than 45. Another extreme group was cross-border Hungarians having moved to Budapest, among whom three-quarters were younger than 30. The adventurous nature required for migration is stronger among men, who made up 56 percent of the

For the sake of clarity we classified the immigrant groups into eight types (see Table 1). We differentiated groups coming from North Africa, Europe, the Americas and Asia. The study took place in a very heterogeneous field, given that it covered not only „classic” migrant groups but also others (like Italians in Switzerland) who lived a much shorter distance from their country of origin. There was also a group (ethnic Hungarians migrating to Hungary from neighbouring countries) for whom language barriers or serious identity problems were not present concerning the host population.

Table 1
Ethnic groups¹³ examined, according to host city

	Barcelona	Madrid	Geneva	Zurich	Lyon	London	Milan	Budapest
North African	x	x			x		x	
Latino	x	x				x	x	
Turkish				x				x
Indian, Bangladeshi						x		
Chinese								x
Kosovar			x	x				
Ethnic Hungarian								x
Italian			x	x				

When examining the degree of trust our research design made it possible to distinguish between two types of trust: general trust in people and confidence in the institutions and public figures of the host country.¹⁴

The starting point of our first hypothesis was that immigrants have fewer resources compared to members of the majority society, and as such trust is seen as a resource that is a necessary condition for integration. We assumed that

sample. Male dominance was particularly strong among North African and Turkish groups. An exception to this was Arabs living in Lyon, where the high proportion of second-generation immigrants meant that the sexes had evened out. The proportion of women was higher than average only among Latin American groups. Despite the male majority in immigrant groups and the young mean age there was a high proportion of married persons (60 percent), but a quarter of spouses did not (yet) live in the host country. Close to 60 percent of the immigrants did not have children.

¹³ In the sample selection process the criteria was the ethnic self-identification of the interviewed person to be selected.

¹⁴ We included a direct question in our questionnaire in order to measure the respondent's level of trust on an 11-point scale. The scale of trust in the host country's institutions and public figures was calculated using an aggregate index composed of several questions. High scores on the index indicate a high level of trust in institutions and public figures, while low scores indicate a lack of trust.

immigrants have stronger generalized and strategic trust than the citizens of the host country. Figure 1, however, shows that with the exception of migrants in Budapest and Milan, general trust in people was higher among members of the majority in every city, though the differences were not significant. The cities do not vary much from one another in this aspect. Majority members and immigrants in Lyon both showed a visible lack of trust.¹⁵




Figure 1

The level of general trust in people among immigrant and the autochthonous¹⁶ groups according to city (averages on an 11-point scale)

Results regarding the level of trust in institutions is different. Beyond the fact that the autochthonous groups and migrants in cities have more trust toward institutions than toward people, it is also clear that immigrants have more trust in institutions than autochthonous groups do.

¹⁵ Our data is similar to the summed results of the European Social Survey. The European average on a scale of 0 to 10 was 4.7, in our sample it was 4.8. Cf. European Social Survey, 2004.

¹⁶ As control group, a similar survey was carried out in each cities on a sample of the autochthonous population




Figure 2

Level of trust in institutions among immigrant and autochthonous groups according to city (averages on an 11-point scale)

It thus appears that insecurity experienced by migrants results in a lack of trust in personal relations. At the same time the intention to conform, the expectations with regard to the host country, or the negative image of the country of origin strengthen the trust that immigrants have toward the institutions of the host country. For this reasons we have to refine our first hypothesis. We have shown that for the migrants trust is strengthened by the faith in institutions of the new country. This type of trust is known in the literature as bridging trust.

Our second hypothesis states that in migrant groups, members of the co-ethnic group are the most significant and strongest sources of trust. This is supported by the observation in the literature on migration that states that for migrants the own diaspora living in the host country is the most important support (this is known in the literature as bonding trust). The relative weight of trust in one's own ethnic group varies widely across cities.




Figure 3

Level of general trust in people and in own ethnic group among immigrants across cities (averages on an 11-point scale)

As can be seen in Figure 3, in Spanish and Swiss cities trust in people and trust in members of one's own ethnic group do not diverge significantly. In other cities immigrants trust fellow immigrants to a significantly higher degree.

The explanation for difference among cities can be related to two different aspects. The first is the nature of the host country and the city's defining cultural and social milieu, while the second has to do with immigrants' cultural roots and ethnic embeddedness. In other words, we have to answer whether the exceptions in Figure 3 arise from the effects of divergent urban contexts or from differences in the ethnic background of immigrants. In order to answer this question, we should take into account the effect of both the city and that of the local ethnic groups.




Figure 4

General trust in people and in own ethnic group among immigrants across cities and immigrant groups (averages on an 11-point scale)

Given the structure of the sample it is not always possible to separate the effect of urban context from that of the ethnic component. There are migrant groups in the sample that appear in only one city (e.g. Chinese in Budapest), and for such groups the effect of urban context cannot be examined. However, for those migrant groups where comparison is possible we see that trust in one's own ethnic group is basically dependent on the city, and less so on the characteristics of the ethnic group.¹⁷ The effect of cities, however, is not consistent. North African immigrants in Barcelona and Madrid are less trusting of their own ethnic groups than of their Spanish hosts. The opposite is true in Lyon, where the general level of trust is lower. In Milan there is no difference between the level of trust in local Italians and in the members of the own group. For Latin American migrant groups the effect of the urban context is negligible, and there is no significant difference between the level of trust in members of one's own group and those of the majority society. Turks in Budapest are much

¹⁷ In a variance-analysis model in which we explain trust in the own ethnic group as a function of the host city (contextual effect) or the ethnic identity of the immigrants, the eta of the city is 0.25, and 0.21 for ethnic membership.

more trusting than their compatriots in Zurich. While in Switzerland the level of trust in members of the host society and the own group is about even, in Budapest there is a somewhat higher level of trust in members of their own group (compared to trust in Hungarians). The only Indian-Bangladeshi migrant group in the sample is located in London. In their case we can only state that they display a higher level of trust in the members of their own group compared to people in general. The same can be said for Chinese immigrants in Budapest. Kosovars living in Switzerland trust members of their own group somewhat more than the citizens of Geneva or Zurich. However, the Kosovars in Zurich are less trusting than those in Geneva. Italians in Switzerland do not differentiate between the citizens of the host country and members of their own ethnic group when it comes to trust; however, they see Zurich as a friendlier city. Ethnic Hungarians display a high level of trust, one which is stronger toward their own group than it is for citizens of Hungary.

Figure 4 also indicates how general trust in people develops in various migrant groups across cities. We can state that the urban context effect is much stronger than that of ethnic membership.¹⁸ General trust in people also reflects the image that the host city presents to migrant groups. In this aspect Lyon can be seen as the least friendly city, while Budapest is the friendliest one. Cities do not “treat” all migrant groups in the same way. Zurich is seen as much less friendly among Turks as it is among Italians. Madrid “deals” with Latin Americans more poorly than it does with those arriving from North Africa.

General trust in people and in one’s own ethnic group is asymmetric in Switzerland and Spain, and especially so in Lyon. It appears that in the eyes of immigrants Spain and Switzerland are countries where people can be trusted, and immigrants living in these countries are not forced to compensate for possible trust deficits by exaggerating trust in their own ethnic group. The situation is the opposite in Lyon. North Africans living there are characterised by general distrust toward the host population (autochthonous group), which they try to balance by increasing trust in their own group.

These results indicate that trust capital can have a role in the integration strategies of immigrants. High general trust can result in an adaptive, integrative strategy. Exclusive trust in one’s own group can result in a (self-) segregationist approach. The situation is quite mixed, given that the level of trust in the own group and in people in general can change due to the migration history of the group, cultural background and the microclimate of the host city.

Whether discussing trust in institutions or general trust in people, we can establish that migrants – in divergent ways, depending on ethnic membership and the nature of the host society – can rely on trust as a capital. Taking into consideration the level of trust in one’s own group, we may ask whether we can

¹⁸ The urban context effect is 0.26, while that of ethnic membership is 0.17 in the variance analysis model.

identify clear groups by the level of trust immigrants have in the institutions of the host country, whether they have to rely instead on trust in members of their own group or whether they have a high level of trust in people in general. We searched for such groups using cluster analysis. The levels of trust capital range from complete distrust to absolute trust.

Table 2
Configuration of trust capital, cluster centres and frequency distribution

	General trust in people	Trust in members of own ethnic group	Trust in institutions	Frequency of type
Complete distrust	1.7	2.1	3.7	12.8
Trust in institutions only	1.2	1.3	6.9	10.8
Medium trust and preference of own group	4.7	6.1	4.4	24.1
Medium trust but high trust in institutions	5.5	4.8	7.0	27.1
Absolute trust	7.6	8.0	6.9	25.2

Table 2 shows that 13 percent of immigrants are characterized by absolute distrust. That is to say, they trust neither the members of their own group nor institutions and they do not trust people in general. One-tenth of immigrants do not trust people (neither generally nor members of their own group) but do display relatively high trust in the institutions of the host country. Two groups have medium-level trust (and they have a proportion of about one-quarter each). While one such group prefers members of its own ethnic group in terms of trust, the other rather trusts institutions. The last group is characterized by high general trust. The proportion of this group is approximately 25 percent.

In terms of trust capital, there are significant differences among the investigated cities. Figure 5 presents these differences in detail. The most significant differences are the following: migrants living in Lyon are very suspicious, while those living in Budapest are just the opposite, as they have a high degree of trust. Among migrants living in Budapest we find no one belonging to the type that trusts only institutions. This type is very rare in Lyon as well. It is common for migrants in Budapest and London to have a medium level of trust and to prefer trusting members of their own group. Migrants in Spanish and Swiss cities have medium levels of trust but instead prefer trusting institutions.




Figure 5
Configuration of trust capital across cities, percent

Figure 6 helps us see the degree of variation among migrant groups in terms of levels of trust capital within cities. In some cases we can examine what type of trust is characteristic of given migrant groups and how this is dependent on the city in which they settled. North Africans in Madrid have more trust than immigrants from Latin America, but the latter group has a higher frequency of trusting institutions while having low general trust. Before we assume that we have observed the influence of the cultural background of immigrants, we should observe that the opposite is the case in Milan. Latin Americans have a higher level of trust there than North Africans, and there are many North Africans there who trust only institutions. The microclimates of the host cities certainly effect whether migrants will trust institutions or people and the degree to which they will prefer members of their own group. This is illustrated by the case of North Africans in Barcelona and Madrid.




Figure 6
Configuration of trust capital across cities and according to immigrant groups, percent

The microclimates of the cities are to a large degree influenced by the policy and the historical links if any of the host country toward immigrants and the prejudices that the host population (autochthonous group) has toward immigrant groups (and these prejudices may vary across groups). This is well illustrated by the example of North Africans and Turks. North Africans in Lyon are very distrusting and this is certainly related to the situation of Arabs in France. The picture is a bit hostile in Italian cities, while the levels of trust among North Africans are the highest in Spanish towns. Regarding the situation of Turkish migrants, those living in Zurich do have a lower level of trust than those in Budapest, indicating Turkish that immigrants in Hungary feel more at home. At the same time we must observe that there is hardly any difference in the levels of trust between Turkish and Kosovar migrants in Zurich. This may lead us to conclude that the significance of the historic-cultural difference between the two groups is lowered given the homogeneous reception toward all types of immigrants in Switzerland. This homogeneous reception seems even more likely when we observe that migrants from Kosovo in both Zurich and Geneva have almost exactly the same types of trust. The situation is, however, complicated by the situation of Italians in Switzerland. The cultural background

and historical presence of Italians in Switzerland result in a special treatment. This in turn results in a higher level of trust among Italians as compared to other immigrant groups. There are, however, differences among the Italians across cities, given that those in Geneva have a lower level of trust. Regarding capital types among migrants from Turkey in Switzerland and Budapest, we can see that Hungary should not be treated as an oasis for immigrants. The positive situation of Turks in Hungary is unique, as it is tempered by distrust among Chinese and immigrant ethnic Hungarians in Hungary.

We can observe that different types of trust (whether an immigrant is trusting, whether he/she trusts the host country's institutions or the members of his/her own group, and whether he/she generally trusts people) depends not only on ethnic background but on the migration policy and milieus of the host cities as well.

THE COMPLEX EXPLANATORY MODEL OF THE LEVEL OF TRUST AMONG IMMIGRANTS

Having become familiar with the types of trust capital and the divergent levels of trust across cities and ethnic groups, we now return to our original question, namely, how trust influences the success of migration. This is naturally a very complex question with numerous theoretical and methodological problems. Among these the most obvious is the definition of success. Given that the international comparative research we rely on did not focus on this question, we have to clarify that success – whatever it may mean in theory – was operationalised using only one question¹⁹: the occupation of the immigrant and its ensuing prestige. Of course occupational prestige provides a narrow perspective on the situation of migrants.²⁰ However, we should acknowledge

¹⁹ The questionnaires used in the international study contained both mandatory and optional questions. Among the mandatory questions only that dealing with occupational prestige can be interpreted as a measure of success. Among the optional questions, there were several variables (e.g. subjective status in the country of origin and the host country, preference between settling in Hungary or seeing Hungary as a transit country, etc.), but these questions were not identical and did not allow us to work out unified indicators.

²⁰ It would seem obvious to go beyond occupational prestige and to use educational attainment to better operationalise success. However, among immigrants, this is not useful for two reasons. First, there is only a tentative relationship between educational attainment and occupational prestige for immigrants (compared to autochthonous groups). This is because immigrants have difficulties in terms of language, employment, accreditation of degrees, etc., meaning immigrants will often accept work that is below what they were trained for. Further, education attainment is often “brought” and not attained in the host country. In this sense it cannot be related to success in integration. (The survey could not ascertain whether high educational attainment was achieved in the country of origin or in the host country.)

that the comparison of occupational prestige among autochthonous and immigrant groups allow us to measure whether immigrants are placed at the periphery of the host country's society or whether they have integrated into the social hierarchy.




Figure 7
*Occupational prestige for migrants and autochthonous groups,
Treiman prestige scale averages²¹*

Across all the studied cities immigrants on average had lower occupational prestige than autochthonous groups²², except for immigrants living in London, where the difference is striking: immigrants can reach similar level of occupational status as autochthonous groups do. In Switzerland, with the exception of

²¹ Treiman's standard international occupational prestige scale consists of prestige scores for 509 occupations, 288 unite groups, 84 minor groups and 11 major categories. The scale has a range from 1 to 100. The international mean scale score computed over all the occupations is 43.3.

²² Given the unique situation of migrant groups in Hungary, very few immigrants have a full-time job (Chinese are employed mostly in companies dealing with trade and catering and are often not registered as workers. Many of the Turkish migrants are active in the grey economy. The majority of ethnic Hungarian immigrants are young and are still at school.) Occupational prestige measures would have covered only five percent of the sample. For this reason we have not included Hungary in our analysis.

Italian immigrants, immigrants are markedly on the low end of the occupational hierarchy. We were somewhat surprised that Arabs in Lyon expressing deep distrust, were not far behind the autochthonous population in terms of occupational prestige. This may be due to the fact that the most displeased and thus least trusting young Arabs are unemployed and thus – given that they do not have measurable occupational prestige – they do not appear in this sample.

In our approach occupational prestige and related material success is just one aspect of social integration. Utilising the additional data of the survey, we understood the generational question also as an aspect of success. We looked at whether a respondent was a first- or second-generation immigrant, what proportion of the life of first-generation immigrants was spent in migrant status, and to what degree the respondent was able to learn the language of the host country. Using main component analysis we established an integration index.²³




Figure 8
*Level of integration across cities and ethnic groups,
 main component score averages*

²³ The main component preserved 60 percent of the information contained in the variables. A high score on the index indicates a high degree of integration.

Figure 8 shows that the ethnic background of the immigrant, the microclimate of the city, and in some cases the host country have an effect on the level of integration. Italy seemed to be a place where immigrants could not integrate into society regardless of their ethnic background. London is the opposite extreme, where immigrants from both the former colonies and from Latin America successfully integrated. The effect of urban microclimate is exemplified by Madrid and Barcelona, where North Africans integrated less in the former city. Italians are more integrated in Geneva than in Zurich. The effect of ethnic group is illustrated by the fact that in Madrid the integration of Arabs is lower than that of Latin Americans.

To this point we have discussed the structural aspect of integration, i.e. we examined what objective parameters indicate the integration of an immigrant into the host society. Integration, however, contains a subjective aspect as well: the degree to which immigrants feel themselves to be members of the host society, the degree to which they feel connected to their new country²⁴, whether they have experienced anti-immigrant discrimination²⁵, and how difficult they feel immigrant life is.²⁶ The aggregate main component of these three indicators²⁷ shows the degree to which immigrants feel at home in the host country.

The difference between host countries is the strongest element regarding the subjective aspect of integration. Differences between cities and between ethnic groups within cities are much less significant. Immigrants feel the least accepted in Italy and the most accepted in Switzerland. Comparing Figures 8 and 9 we see that the levels of integration in structural and cognitive terms are quite divergent. In terms of structural integration London appears to be the most accepting city, but in subjective terms immigrants in Switzerland have the highest scores. Italy is a disadvantageous place for integration in both structural and cognitive senses. The bad mood characterizing Lyon is evident in this dimension as well; despite the fact that working immigrants in Lyon are objectively integrated, in cognitive terms we can see that they do not feel at home.

²⁴ Ties to the host country were measured using two questions focusing on connections to residents of the country and to the host city. The indicator of ties to the host country is a simple aggregation of these numbers.

²⁵ Experience of discrimination was measured with a simple yes/no question.

²⁶ This indicator is an aggregate of four questions: how difficult it is to get a residence permit; how difficult it is to get citizenship; how difficult it is to bring your family to the host country; how difficult it is to find work. Low scores indicate a very difficult life for the immigrant, while a high score indicates the simplicity of integration.

²⁷ High scores on the main component indicate that the migrant group feels at home in the given city.




Figure 9
*The cognitive aspects of integration by city and ethnic group,
 main component score averages*

We can now turn to the construction of the model referred to in the introduction, i.e. we can examine the degree to which trust contributes to successful integration. Before introducing the model, it is worth noting that from the point of view of integration, we only took into account general trust in people and trust in the institutions of the host country. We assume that trust in one's own migrant group encourages segregation, and not integration.²⁸ Our model makes use of a path model to show the degree to which trust contributes to integration, and to what degree a cognitive aspect of integration is necessary for the operation of trust capital.

²⁸ Our data shows that trust in one's own group clearly weakens the cognitive aspect of integration and in turn weakens structural integration.




Figure 10
The path model of trust and integration

Before we interpret Figure 10, we would like to turn back to the theoretical discussion in the introduction where we reviewed the literature on trust to define trust as a type of capital that has an important role in the success of migration. Our path model clearly does not support this definition. Trust is an obstacle to the structural integration of immigrants, given that we can see a negative number above the arrow leading from trust to structural integration. It is true that if such trust is paired with positive cognitive aspects of integration, it assists successful integration. This indirect positive effect does not supersede the empirical experience that for migrants distrust in people and the institutions of the country strengthen the level of integration

We must consider whether distrust contributes to success for the autochthonous populations of the host cities.²⁹ We noticed that in their case there was a positive correlation between trust and status³⁰, thus trust truly functions as capital. If this is the case, then we may suspect that the reason for a negative relationship between trust and successful integration for migrants lies in the status of migrants.

We assume that for migrants trust is not a cause but rather a consequence. To illustrate this assumption we use a path model in which we try to explain the level of trust with the degree of cognitive and structural integration. This is shown in Figure 11.

²⁹ For autochthonous populations the indicator for structural integration is meaningless. For them we measured status by using occupational prestige and educational attainment, and we used this as an indicator of integration.

³⁰ For autochthonous populations trust influences status with a beta of +0.14.




Figure 11
The path model of integration and trust

The first thing we see is that integration better explains the level of trust than vice-versa. True, distrust is characteristic of better integrated immigrants, but those immigrants who are pleased with their lives feel a great deal of trust. This leads us to conclude that for immigrants trust cannot be seen as a form of capital. Instead, trust is a feeling much like the positive view on integration and as such it is an expression of acceptance of or satisfaction with the status of the migrant. (A counterargument may state that the method used in the study to measure trust was somewhat misleading. As a method it was inappropriate because trust measured in the same way among autochthonous groups had a positive effect on status, so it functioned as capital for them.) The negative correlation between structural integration and trust is an indication of the vulnerability of immigrants, even if just indirectly. We may argue that those subordinated immigrants who are pushed to the periphery of society and have low-prestige occupations are forced to place greater trust in people and in the institutions of the host country. Those who are more successful – experiencing the problems and difficulties in getting integrated – are more critical of the country's institutions and the majority population. The harmonic but very infrequent situation (see Figures 8 and 9) when structural integration is successful in a cognitive sense as well is a scenario that can strengthen trust.

CONCLUSION

The trust that a migrant feels toward people and the institutions of the host country can only be understood in the entirety of the multidimensional migratory space: defined by his/her individual life history, distinct personality, cul-

tural differences between origin and host country, the average attained position, the acceptance of the members of his/her own migrant group within the host country, and the historical, legal, economic, political and social-psychological characteristics of the host environment. The elaborated analysis of this space would have exceeded the framework of the utilised international empirical study. Our analytical constraints allowed us to measure only the level of trust in the given countries, cities and among the relevant immigrant groups. In the same way we could only illustrate the relationship between trust and integration using a rather simple model. Our comparison was hindered by the fact that the research on the strength of trust and its role in integration was conducted in diverse countries, cities and among ethnic groups with varied backgrounds.

The results show that trust plays an important role in the settlement and adaptation of immigrants into host countries. This is indicated by the fact that trust in institutions is higher among migrant groups than it is for the local majority. However, trust in one's own group must be seen as a „tool” that can balance out the emotional and identity deficit brought on by the migrant experience. In this case trust serves the purpose of attaining the original goals of migration and making integration successful.

In our theoretical discussion we treated trust as a type of capital that can help immigrants (who lack tools and are poor in terms of other capitals like money, cultural skills, family network etc.) achieve successful integration. Our data, however, shows that the relationship between trust and integration is not so simple. Migration itself, excluding those cases where one is forced to leave his/her country of origin, assumes that the migrant has faith in the future, has confidence in the success of the migration, and hopes that the institutions of the host country will help him/her adapt, and has a general trust that people are good-willed. But in the moment of arrival exaggerated trust is paired with a perfect lack of integration. This is reflected in our model, in which we see that high trust is coupled with low integration. As time goes by, in most cases immigrants more or less integrate. At the same time they loose many of the illusions with which they arrived. This can reduce the level of trust. We also saw, however, that if the method and level of integration satisfied the immigrant then trust could become an emotion that strengthens success through a cognitive filter. As we saw, among autochthonous groups trust acts as a form of capital that increases the chances of social success. For immigrants it is integration that provides them with trust, but only when the migrant feels that such integration has been successful.

The structure of this study makes it difficult to follow those slight differences caused by immigrants' cultural-ethnic background, the attitudes of the citizens of host countries, or the immigration policies and activities of institutions designed to assist integration. We can simplify the consideration of this complex set of correlations by using a contextual model in which we study the

relation between trust and integration while paying attention to the degree of welfare (the level of GDP per capita) and multiculturalism (the proportion of migrants in the population) of the host cities. Wealthier cities like London, Milan or Lyon offer higher chances for immigrants to successfully integrate, but this is paired with a kind of dissatisfaction and distrust – likely as a result of relative deprivation. This is evident through the fact that such immigrants do not feel their integration has been successful, have little trust in the host country's institutions, and are not at all well-meaning toward the citizens of the host country. Immigrants do feel more at home in ethnically plural cities. This is evident not only through higher trust in people and institutions but also in the fact that their integration – even in their own estimation - is much more successful in such cities. It thus appears that successful integration of immigrants is most likely in rich and ethnically pluralistic cities. Richer cities offer a rise in standard of living for immigrants, but if they compare their situations only to that of autochthonous groups, then they will become distrusting and dissatisfied. However, should many kinds of immigrants live in such cities, the basis for comparison will be their own group and thus their position in life – although it may be more modest – will be satisfactory and will generate trust.

Translated by Ferenc Zsigó

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