Globalization and migration

Globalization and migration are interconnected terms. In studying globalization we cannot avoid international migrants who cross borders and actively participate in the recent restructuring of global social and economic space. In migration studies globalization understood as a new set of economic and social processes has become a major interpretative framework in understanding the changes in contemporary migratory movements. In this respect this newsletter aims at providing information and short analyses on three countries, Finland (already in the European Union), Hungary (accessing EU) and Russia (being another global focus point). This comparison has been initiated by three respected institutes in the relevant countries (Siberian Center for Applied Research in Economics, Novosibirsk; Center for Ethnic Relations at Helsinki University, in Helsinki, and Demographic Research Institute at the Central Statistical Office in Budapest), which project has been generously funded by USAID (URCI) in the United States. In addition to the comparative papers here we also publish some analyses on such migrant groups in Hungary (like the Chinese) or such migratory directions and phenomena (EU citizens living in Hungary, or the problem of ethnicity) which are extremely relevant from the perspective of globalization. This newsletter has been specially edited for the Workshop: ‘Globalization, Migration and Ethnicity’ to be held in Budapest between December 3–7, 2003.

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East–West Labor Migration, Bilateral Agreements and Globalization³

East-to-West migration became a major issue following the political and economic changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. After the first signs of considerable emigration from the previously communist region, countries of Western Europe soon enacted restrictive regulations. The arguments were mostly connected with the increasing unemployment and the burden of migrants onto the welfare systems of West European states. Policy implications of migration are mostly based on the theoretical assumption of migration driven by wages or GDP per person differences, supposing that considerable income differences would induce migration. (Layard et al 1992, Walterkirchen–Dietz 1998, Bauer–Zimmermann 1999, Brücker–Frazemeyer 1997, Birner–Huber–Winkler 1998).

Whatever the argument may have been, one more, still uniform, general assumption has always been hidden there: long-term versus permanent migration. Surprisingly, immigration policies in the countries of the European Union are based on theories that explain recent East-West migration mostly as traditional long-term or permanent migration. However, the importance of new types of migration is well known and described in some detail. Contrary to the previous, mostly permanent, migration, East-West migration in the 1990s assumed a new feature: economic migrants and commuters move spontaneously to countries of the European Union for limited periods (Morokvasic–Rudolph, 1994; Jazwinski–Okolski, 1996; Wallace et al., 1996; Czakó–Sík, 1999; Iglíczka, 1999).

Immigration regulations (entries, exits, support etc.) differ, however, by categories of foreigners like foreign laborers, refugees, asylum seekers or ethnic migrants. Immigration policies are mostly designed to differentiate between the various groups of foreigners. Some groups are encouraged to

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³ The complete study can be downloaded from www.econ.co.hu.

¹ US Agency for International Development.

² University Research Corporation International.

³ "Poplar": This name was chosen to reflect the Hungarian title of the newsletter, KonFa, which is the Hungarian equivalent of the technical term 'age pyramid', but literally means 'age-tree' ('kofa'='age', 'fű='='tree').
migrate while others face strong restrictions. Labor migration is partly encouraged, partly limited, although regulations mostly correspond to the receiving countries' interest even if migrants would not accept them.

Channeled labor migration into Europe, to solve temporarily the labor shortage of West-European countries, is not a new idea. We could refer here to the immigration system of the 1950s and 1960s that was characterized by large-scale migration encouraged by bilateral labor agreements. This type of labor immigration rooted in guest-worker systems followed the post-war economic boom and was limited in time, labor market access and labor market safety. This labor demand had been met by recruitment from several Mediterranean countries: at first in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, later in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia (Casdée-Miller, 1993; Müinz, 1995). The most important guest-worker program took place in West-Germany (named the "Gastarbeiter" program according to its German origin), which was initiated during the economic boom of the mid 50s and was closed in fear of the labor market crisis of the early 1970s. The attempts of Germany failed, however, to stop the recruitment of guest workers, resulting in increasing migration of family members and the growing importance of contact networks in general (Castles, 1989; Boyd, 1989).

The history of channeled labor migration on bilateral bases from Eastern to Western Europe goes back to the mid 1970s, to those years when political initiatives had already been taken with the purpose of securing an additional labor influx into Germany from the East. Bilateral treaties were signed by the German Federal Government with Central and Eastern European countries – as "part of the new policy towards the East" (Rudolph, 1994).

Controlled immigration has gained priority preference recently. The institutional development of the European Union (the Schengen Agreement) supports similar bilateral agreements between the countries of the European Union and those outside the Union. The purpose of the agreement is to bring about guest-worker programs of their own by each member country of the European Union. Bilateral agreements are believed to be the proper technique to channel labor migration.

The importance of the bilateral agreements has been stressed recently, although the aim of the agreements is contradictory. There are three different, often hidden, goals behind controlling and channelling labor into the EU: (i) additional cheap labor for a limited period for unskilled seasonal work; (ii) additional and relatively cheap skilled labor for structural labor market imbalances; (iii) development of regional labor markets. Various opinions on the advantages of bilateral agreements argue for one or the other benefit of the bilateral agreements.

The most common opinion focuses on the demand for unavoidable cheap unskilled foreign seasonal work that is often illegal in Europe. A relevant paper argues that the importance of the bilateral programs is channelling the illegal labor migration into the desired legal channel: "To some extent, bilateral agreements have also had a positive effect in channeling illegal migration into legal seasonal work." (Garnier, 2001: 148). Other arguments consider the skilled labor as a cheap one according to a sincere opinion on the advantages of using cheap labor by the countries of the European Union which says: "... within a changing UK labor market, increasingly dominated by service industries, foreign workers provide an important means of flexibility. If they are relatively low paid, as CHEPS (i.e. Czech R. Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia) nationals may well be, especially when they come in for training purposes, then they are even more attractive. A more detailed analysis is needed of the use being made by UK companies of, and the salaries paid to, the citizens of the CEE area" (Salt–Hogarth, 1999: 64). Despite these contradictions the competent OECD migration report underlines the regional importance of the bilateral agreements: "...the East–West migration flows correspond now to a process of regional integration limited to border regions and regulated by bilateral agreements..." (OECD, 2001: 64).

In an important sense, however, the temporary employment agreements are not completely consistent with the spirit of the European Union's economic policies. Borjas (1999) stresses the importance that "...the temporary worker program, after all, gives the member country that chooses to import large numbers of temporary migrants from other countries a certain type of economic advantage in the market place. After all, the guarantees made by the social welfare system of the member states do not typically extend to the temporary immigrants, so that it is cheaper to use these migrants to produce some goods and services." Garnier (2001) raises another important issue, namely that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe need to consider whether their nationals' interest will be served by signing these agreements which, in fact, exclude the participants from the European Union's general standard of treatment – or give different treatment – than the previous ones have given.

Considering all this, as a rather political consequence, certain member states of the EU announced that they were not prepared to accept the free movement of labor from Central and Eastern Europe following the enlargement as it might distort their labor markets and might increase to social tension. As to other member states, Hungary may enter into bilateral negotiations with a view to ensure liberal or easier access to their labor markets (with small labor emigration experience from Hungary).

There is not much empirical evidence on East–West labor migration, however. Mobility under bilateral agreements is a special framework to stimulate the desired labor migration that has gained particular importance in the enlargement process of the European Union. Is there a considerable relevance of this type of labor migration? Confronting theoretical considerations on bilateral programs with the aim of forcing labor migration into the desired channel offered by the receiving countries with the Hungarian experience of labor migration under these programs we found that these programs were effective to channel labor in the desired way. The structure of the labor migration under these programs coincides, however, with the general migration tendencies. There is the puzzle whether unregulated, unchanneled migration would give a considerably different character to Hungarian labor emigration. What would be our projection?

The theoretical background of our answer is based on the idea of globalization. How important is migration in the recent economic processes? According to Baldwin–Martin (1999) we define globalization as a continuous process with two different periods: that from the mid 1800s until 1914 and that since the 1960s. They underline the relatively diminishing importance of migration to other indicators of globalization (trade, capital flow / FDI, factor prices) in the recent globalization tendencies. Without going into details I would just refer here to the low level of migration among the present member states of the EU. According to relevant studies, immigration from non-member countries of CEE into the present member states remained rather limited (Boeri–Brücker, 2000).

There can also be a moralist answer from our recent Nobel Prize winner in literature. This kind of approach would not confront the globalization trend, however. "As it just seemed somehow immoral from here, from the Eastern side of the Wall, the Iron Curtain. The lack of solidarity, the way they unconditionally threw these small countries to the Big Eastern Manauer, to Stalin's Soviet Union. And the way, as compasile conformists, they declared this act to be the ground stone of world stability and peace. It may be pleasant, what is more even useful to do one's daily gardening in the shade of a shameful (even if, I allow for it, perhaps unavoidable) pact. We cannot have any doubt, however, that a garden like this would not grow the European idea. Those anxious calculations that they been running for almost ten years about the possible costs of enlarging the European Union with the Eastern countries clearly show just that. One who does this must have a sober mind but also a hardening of the arteries and a heart as hard as stone." [Imre Kertész, Neue Zürcher Zeitung 20/21 January 2001.]


Distinctive characteristics of Russian migration processes

As a result of the dramatic reconstruction of its social and political life, Russia was confronted with an entirely new migration process. This process was the process of migration into Russia of both a Russian-speaking population and of the residents from other post-Soviet republics, firstly because of political and later because of economic reasons. Until the political reconstruction, the territory of the ex-Soviet Union was a united homogeneous system with identical laws in respect to all the inhabitants of the ex-Soviet Union and, formerly, with a unified labor market. The unity was secured both by that fact that no visas were necessary to cross the borders, and by the absence of special restrictions in respect to the labor flows from different republics within the united system of the Union. The biggest migration exchange in the period from 1991 till 2000 was between Russia and the Newly Independent States/Baltic republics. From other regions of the world less than 200 thousand people migrated to Russia. From the Baltic republics—according to the data of the State Statistical Committee, for the same period of time—more than 7 million migrants arrived into Russia. More than 70% of these new arrivals to Russia from NIS countries and the Baltic States, in the period from 1991 till 2000, were granted Russian citizenship and became naturalized. Such a large percentage of naturalization could be explained by the directive according to which Russia will be a legislative successor of the Soviet Union for that period and also because of a simplified procedure of granting Russian citizenship, which together with the ethnic and language identification also might have played a major role in the naturalization of the migrants in the new Russia. The absence of the language barrier is still one of the most important factors which stimulates migration to Russia from the ex-Soviet republics. Taking into consideration the number of migrating foreigners and the number of people who took Russian citizenship, we can suppose that in 2000 on the territory of Russia there were two million and sixty thousand foreign citizens from NIS and the Baltic republics.

Since 1997, initiation of new tendencies in the characteristics of migration flow into Russia could be observed. To begin with, there was a reduction in the numbers of migrants from NIS and the Baltic Republics. After 1997, the number of people who arrived from NIS and the Baltic Republics to Russia within one year did not exceed 500 thousand people, but in 1994 more than one million migrants from the above regions arrived into Russia. With the falling of registration norms and the difficulties in controlling migration, the observation of legal and illegal migration was getting more and more difficult, and the migration process as a whole started to become unmanageable.

The estimates of the numbers of illegal migrants are between 300 thousand and 5 million people. One of the expert evaluation methods to determine the size of illegal migration is based on the index of those breaching migration legislation. If we accept that the number of registered breaks of regulations is approximately 10% of the whole number of illegal migration cases, the number of illegal migrants in Russia could be estimated as being on the level of 2 million people. In 2002 the federal law ‘On the legal status of foreign citizens in Russian Federation’ was accepted and the federal law ‘On the citizenship of Russian Federation’ was essentially changed in November 2003. The above laws were complemented by several governmental acts and acts with the force of law. As a whole, a rather strong and effective legislative base was created for the control of the migration processes. The investigation of the new immigration legislation and the gained practice of its implementation allows us to suggest that the main goals of Russian migration politics are the control of the migration flows, the reduction of illegal migration, the strengthening of the fiscal aspect in regard to foreign labor migration.

It is worth mentioning that after the implementation of the legislative and organizational measures, migration flows have now been taken.
Globalizing capital and lacking labor in Finland

When comparing the three respective countries from the Finnish perspective, the preliminary results suggest that labor migration in all respective countries is affected both by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the globalization of economic capital. Finland can be considered as having the strongest control of migration flows, despite having the shortest history as a country of immigration. In terms of capital flows, Finland follows the European Union regulations, and has opened up fast during the last decade.

Trends in foreign investment and foreign labor

During the period of increasing labor migration to Western European countries, Finland was a country of emigration. Only at the end of the 1980s did net immigration appear. The recently settled immigrant population in Finland is ethnically, and also socially, very heterogeneous. It is suggested that because of this ethnic heterogeneity, the formation of ethnic communities—such as those that the traditional minorities have—is not yet possible in the same sense.

The Finnish history is unlike other Nordic countries. For about 60 years until the 1980s, Finland was an isolated area which was almost unaffected by the immigration occurring in many other Western industrial societies. The same isolation appears in the movement of capital and foreign direct investment to Finland. Until the beginning of the 1990’s, Finnish economy was very dependent on trade with the Soviet Union. Only the collapse of the SU, and the opening-up of the national economy to foreign investments and companies, resulted in an increasing international movement of capital in and out of Finland.

Between 1995 and 2000, annual foreign direct investment to Finland increased from 6.2 billion Euro to 26.1 billion, whilst Finnish direct investments abroad increased even more, from 11 billion Euro in 1995, to 56 billion in 2000. Therefore, in the case of Finland, at least from 1995 onwards, there has been a situation of negative international net investment, and of positive net migration.

The rising amount of immigrants has so far not been connected in a straightforward way with the increased movement of capital, due to the fact that most immigration has occurred on the basis of Finnish origin (Ingrian "re-migration" from Northwest Russia and Estonia), strong family ties or people seeking asylum. In other words, the reasons for migration have so far been largely other than those that could be linked to the international movement of capital.

The capital region of Helsinki is in a case of its own. It has almost half of the foreign nationals and immigrants in Finland, and around one fifth of the total population. In 1999, 71 percent of companies operating in Finland, in which foreign ownership was over 50 percent, were located in the Helsinki metropolitan area, having over 40 percent of their personnel there, and gaining 55 percent of their annual turnout from units operating in the area.

The Helsinki metropolitan area is the region most connected with international capital, and this has the highest density of foreign nationals. However, as the reason for immigration has mostly been other than labor,
the nature of this connection may be mostly arbitrary, or mediated through some complex social mechanisms. In terms of ownership, the most common country of origin was Sweden (30 percent of foreign-owned companies), followed by the United States (15 percent), Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. Therefore, the strong economic link between Finland and the EU has changed into clear economic integration with other EU countries, and the US. On the other hand, most immigration—apart from Sweden—is received from other neighboring areas, namely Estonia and Russia. It seems that the emerging forces of chain migration are for now not linked to the flows of capital. This may be due to the short immigration history and the fact that immigrant communities and ethnic economies are still quite thin and undeveloped in Finland.

Trends in issuing work permits show clear concentrations between certain nationalities and branches of employment. This gives no reason to speculate, that there are transnational information networks constructing paths between foreign labor and the Finnish labor market. However, in quantity, most of the work permits are given in spheres of labor which are not highly connected with foreign capital, such as seasonal harvesting work. In terms of productivity, it would require a more thorough analysis of the connections between foreign ownership and the composition of corporate personnel.

Until the development of actual ethnic economies in Finland, it might be expected that capital still flows in from the West, and workers from the East. The problem for Finland is, that social-economic scenarios suggest that Finland is going to face severe difficulties in trying to attract foreign labor to the country. This immigration of labor will be seen as needed in the future, due to the aging population, which will create large numbers in age groups which are exiting the labor market, with an inadequate inflow of domestic labor replacing them. The innovation- and information-based production will also require such skilled labor, which is not fully available in Finland. Both active international recruitment and processes of chain migration are therefore needed in order to secure an adequate supply of labor in the future.

**Difficulties in finding employment**

The immigrant population grew rapidly in the 1990s, during a deep economic recession. Because the reasons for immigration were normally not labor related, Finland is now facing a problem which has been typical in Western European countries previously; how to create employment for immigrants, whose immigration is not based on the demand for their labor. Labor force participation rates for immigrants are generally much lower than for Finnish nationals, which could be the reflection of a process where the difficulty of finding employment makes people choose to stay out of the labor force altogether. Labor force participation rates are low especially for refugee and other immigrant women.

**Conclusions**

Most of the employed immigrants find their employment through informal networks which were most often formed between co-ethnics. This trend is most clear in the restaurant business. Also, in this sense, the emergence of larger settled immigrant communities would help immigrant communities to help themselves in terms of gaining footholds in the Finnish labor market, and by doing that, bringing their very much needed contribution to the aging Finnish society and labor market. Spatial concentration of immigrants helps to boost this development, and therefore it seems that if sufficient immigration of labor is guaranteed, the metropolitan area of Helsinki will be the most vital Finnish knot in the global network of capital and labor.

However, these kinds of ethnic economic networks are not the only way to find employment. They are also often employed in "mainstream" service jobs, such as transportation (especially bus drivers in the Helsinki area), cleaning and both the public and private care services. As the care service business grows, international care service companies will probably enter the Finnish market, bringing their own intra-company personnel migration with them. In addition, multinational companies have their own schemes and channels (international recruitment or international intra-company migration) for getting the highly skilled foreign labor they need.

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* Former Yugoslavia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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4 See for example Florida's account on the "Creative Class" from 2002.
Whereas before the 1990’s Finland was closed from both capital and labor flows and trade-wise was strongly connected to the Soviet Union, it has now opened up so that it terms of investment flows, it has become more closely connected to the EU and US, but in terms of labor migration, Russia will most likely be the most important source of labor for Finland—both in terms of highly skilled and for less skilled labor.


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Globalization and Migration in Hungary

In Hungary the statistical coverage of migrants is naturally incomplete particularly with regard to some groups, which might be important from the perspective of globalization. We have little knowledge about illegal labor migrants who come to exploit the wage gap between different East European countries. In addition, we know little about the domestic servant industry which is once again not really followed and only slightly controlled by the Hungarian state, regardless of the fact that this process is truly transnational and more and more people have become involved in it. Also we have no analysis of the so called “false” tourists, who do some kind of small scale trading on a rather permanent basis (Ókólski 1999, Melegh 2003c). Even more the case when we have better statistics then remains the problem that certain relevant information is missing and we cannot follow the ways how migrants move from one category to the other.

“global service people” have become dominant. These migrants basically come from the more “Eastern” neighboring countries (Sassen, 1999).

The regional distribution of labor (and other types of) migrants also show the features of globalization in the sense that a minor global city (Budapest) and the surrounding county Pest comprising the region “Central Hungary” take most of the labor permit holder migrants. We can even argue that the other counties and regions basically all have an insignificant role. There are two exceptions: namely Csongrád county in the region called the Southern Great Plain, which has received a larger number of laborers and entrepreneurs, escaping from Serbia during the civil wars, and secondly the counties to the immediate West and North-West of the booming region of Central Hungary (Főrjesz and Komárom-Esztergom). That this regional distribution is linked to globalization is clear from the figure which shows that foreign direct investment is following an almost identical spatial pattern (Hansen 2002; Staring in: Kálf et al. 2000; Sassen 1996b, 1999; 2001; Forsander 2002).

Among those holding a labor permit we can clearly see that there is an upward tendency in the number of people receiving a labor permit. By the year 2000 this figure went above 40 thousand and this increase has also continued later as well. In terms of citizenship Romania is by far the most important country for Hungary. It gives almost half of the total labor population. Besides the other “non-Western” neighboring countries, Slovakia, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union (basically the Ukraine), and China, the EU plays a significant role in this transnational movement. Most of the people from neighboring countries are of Hungarian ethnic origin. It is important to note that previous links between state socialist countries have broken down or have been reconfigured, which can be exemplified by the decline in the number of Polish industrial workers.

The reconfiguration of transnational labor movement is even clearer in the case of the sector composition of labor migrants. The disappearance of Polish miners and the gradual increase of people working in the sectors of construction and commercial activity symbolize, not only the radical reconstruction of state socialist economies, but also globalization in the sense that

5 These are excerpts from a background paper for the “Globalization, Migration and Ethnicity” project funded by URCI.
The map of those countries from which Hungary attracts residing foreign citizens also shows interesting characteristics. Together with the actual numbers we can see that the "Eastern" neighboring states are the prime sources of this group just as in the case of labor permits. On the "Western" side Germany plays an important role while there is Russia and Poland which serve as a kind of secondary background. The peak number of residing foreign migrants from the EU and Germany was at the end of the 1990s. Now there is a relative decline, but due to the EU accession it will certainly rise again. Besides the European countries there is another significant group, namely the Chinese (more than 5000) and Vietnamese (above 100). African countries seem to fall into the same category of size, (around 2000). Altogether it seems that Hungary is becoming a place of attraction outside its closest region, although it is still just a regional focus point, which shows that the global position of the country is of an intermediary nature.

Looking at the sex and marital status composition among the foreign citizens immigrating into Hungary (gaining immigration or long term residence permit in the relevant year) there is a clear male dominance, but there is an increase in the ratio of women, just as in the case of residing foreigners. Thus a clear sign of feminization is apparent. It is to be noted that the male dominance is very clear in the case of those who have never married, which show that single men take on the adventure to apply for an immigration permit in Hungary. They can also be the persons who start the process of migration and their family members or friends only come later. Seeing this data, it is feasible to assume that the increasing ratio of women is a "follow-up" process of an earlier migration process.

Combining the internal regional distribution and the citizenship of the immigrating foreigners it is clear that Budapest and the surrounding area is as dominant as in the case of residing foreigners. It even seems that, regardless of the gradual increase in numbers, since the mid 1990s the regional pattern has been stable and showing the same pattern as in the other categories.

The effect of globalization can also be shown in the national composition of immigrants according to regions. Yugoslavian and Ukrainian citizens opt mainly for the neighboring territories. Romanian citizens are the most widely spread, while only Budapest and the central region attracts Chinese and EU citizens in greater numbers.

The occupational composition of immigration of foreign citizens is also showing a globalisation pattern. There is a substantial increase in the number of unemployed or low skilled immigrants. Thus it seems that the members of this group—partly giving up their original skills—partly gets integrated into the "lower" groups of the host society.

In respect to the link between geographic patterns and the above described social- and occupational distribution division we see a clear East/West division. In the 1990s, in the case of Ukraine there is a rather clear shift towards the unskilled and low skilled. They represent more than 50% of the total immigrating population. In the case of Romania a somewhat similar picture emerges. Throughout the 90’s, the main groups have been dominantly by the unskilled or low skilled migrant group. This "lower-class" migration is not a characteristic of all the other sending areas, in which group Yugoslavia might be an interesting example. Migrants from Yugoslavia till the year 2000 are from "elite" groups, which is tantalizing as there was the civil war and so there could have been a variety of reasons for leaving the country. It seems that due to the political restrictions this "elite" group could utilize transnational networks to find a new place outside their home country. From another perspective it could also be argued that until 2000 most of the socialist industry of Yugoslavia was intact in terms of privatization and foreign investment and this together with the border restrictions did not allow the integration into the "European" economy at a lower point of the social hierarchy.

The European Union migrants are the ones who come to Hungary from "above". The EU accession process seems to have offered new positions for some of the educated people in Western Europe utilizing the comparative differences in an opposite manner. Chinese represent a completely different pattern, in which a special group emerges living on commercial entrepreneurship and service work. They do not appear in the above East/West division, they seem to comprise a special ethnic niche.

Altogether globalization, the related economic, labor market changes (privatization, the decline of the industrial capacity and employment levels in the neighboring countries) and the related political, social insecurity and trauma have created a transitory position for Hungary. It is apparent not only in the co-existence of emigration and immigration, but also in the fact that migratory groups linked to globalization come from this country according to a special East/West division. In this East/West movement foreign investment as a prime concern in globalization is a direct engine in one direction, while in the other direction it takes part only in the construction of certain economic and social spaces which "welcome" the low skilled migrants.

From the media reports regarding the European Union accession it was clear that only a part of migration was picked out—despite its well-known complexity, namely the flow of labor from east to west, but parallel countermigration processes were forgotten.

It is interesting that it was not even mentioned that the migration relations between the member-states and the aspirant states are not unidirectional but a significant number of the EU citizens stayed in Hungary from the second half of 1990s. The main purpose of the paper would be to show the other side of the coin.

From the study of data obtained from various sources (National Research and Methodological Center of Labor, Hungarian Central Statistical Office) we got a similar picture regarding the citizens of the European Union working in Hungary on one hand and having a residence or immigration permit for more than one year on the other. We found identical percentages and dynamics moving in a same direction. The basic tendency of the second half of the 1990s was the continuous growth in the number of the citizens of the European Union in Hungary. Parallel with this increase the number of those having come from other countries of origin also grew.

The proportion of European Union citizens with work permit is around 10% of the total number of foreign workers in Hungary. The educational level of citizens from developed Western countries is higher than that of an average migrant with work permit and they typically find jobs in the tertiary sector in Hungary.

Flows and counter-flows: Migration to and from the European Union in Hungary

6 Research project OTKA F34538.
The proportion of the immigrants of active age coming from the European Union and residing in Hungary, however, rose continuously and among the foreign citizens it increased to ten percent. As to the quantity of immigration the role of neighborhood and the closeness to a Western direction is rather small. Compared with Austria more Germans, Croats and British citizens stay in Hungary for a longer period (over one year). The balanced gender composition of the immigrants from the European Union modifies the female dominance to be found in Hungary and their age structure rejuvenates the Hungarian population, though to a small extent.

We suppose that in the related migration system between the European Union and Hungary we could present – though indirectly – the existence of the migration processes from the Union to Hungary. We could find bases of comparison and we could state its extent. The flow from Hungary to the west is not unidirectional because in parallel there is also a counter-flow occurring to a similar extent in the absolute sense. In relative sense, however there is a significant difference in the respect that, while Hungarian emigrants working and staying in the EU disappear in the vast numbers of those coming from third countries, in Hungary each tenth foreign worker with a work permit and that the long-term immigrant staying in the country for more than one year is a citizen of the European Union.

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Transnationalism and localization in an ethnic economy in Hungary: Business and labor strategies of Chinese entrepreneurs

The Chinese constitute one of the most significant groups of the migrant population of Hungary. The largest number of foreigners living in Hungary comes from the neighboring countries, and compared to this figure, the ten or fifteen thousand Chinese do not seem to be significant. But if ethnic Hungarians – who constitute the majority of migrants from neighboring countries – are disregarded, then the Chinese may emerge to first place. At any rate, the Chinese constitute the largest ‘visible minority’ in the eyes of Hungarians. Their migration, similarly to but even more exclusively than with Vietnamese and Arab migrants (whose numbers are smaller), is an entrepreneurial migration of a strongly transnational nature, which fits into the Hungarian economy in an entirely different way from that of Romanian, former Yugoslav, and Ukrainian citizens whose typical motivations have been employment in the Hungarian economy, joining family members or the “mother nation”, or fleeing violence.

“Ideal gold mine for Chinese”: the emergence of an ethnic economy

While the transformation of the economies of scarcity increased the economic attractiveness of migration to Eastern Europe, and the temporary liberalization of immigration regimes created the opportunity to migrate for Chinese entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs, two factors gave a push to the process at the Chinese end of the 90s. The first was the crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989, which created anxiety in the emerging private sector. The enterprises made efforts to find routes of escape for their capital and families in case a hard-line economic change was to come. Second, the recession striking the Chinese economy between 1989 and 1991 hit private enterprises as well as the managers and workers (whose wages sometimes went unpaid) of state-owned companies, as they were unable to sell their stocks. For a significant number of migrants – former state officials, workers, and members of the intelligentsia migration took place simultaneously with becoming entrepreneurs. Leaving the country was actually a way to promote their social mobility within the Chinese society.

Therefore it is not surprising that the educational level of Chinese migrants in Hungary is higher than the Chinese average, and also higher than that of earlier waves of Chinese migration to other countries. About one-fourth of Chinese citizens in the data base of the Ministry of Home Affairs in May 2000, or 2,650 persons, answered ‘manager’ or ‘sales manager’ to the question on professional training; 342 were ‘engineers’, 275 ‘teachers’, 223 ‘clerks’, 183 ‘medical doctors’, 171 ‘economists’, 235 ‘intellectuals’, and 125 were ‘university students’. At the same time, 46% answered ‘manager of a private company’ to the question on occupation. The relatively high level of education characterizing the Chinese in Hungary is also reflected in the fact that in a sample representing 135 market traders, 45% said that they had upper secondary education, and 30% said that they had higher education (Budapesti Föváros 1997).

In early 1992 there were 1,400 enterprises owned by Chinese registered in Hungary. One-third of these were limited liability companies (kft); the rest were sole proprietorships (kt). Their total capital was $20 million, meaning that the average capital of a company was only $1,400, and it reached $2,000 thousand only in five cases. At that time the smallest capital necessary for registering a company corresponded to $8,000, and this sum could serve several registrations by moving from one bank account to another (Nyiri 1999: 50). Those who could not procure the required sum even by joining up with their friends often took loans or sought partners for the investment in China. Due to the advantageous credit agreements concluded with suppliers in China, the annual turnover of the largest Chinese enterprises in Hungary could reach sums between five and thirty million dollars despite their low capitalization (Nyiri 1996: 134).

Ten years later the number of Chinese-owned enterprises, mostly kft, was around one thousand, according to data from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This means that, at least on paper, the majority of Chinese in Hungary had a company of their own. The total registered capital of the companies was $120 million (not including two of the largest investments, the Asia Center and the Bank of China's Budapest branch), according to the Ministry. In other words, average capital was even lower than before, $1,200. This is partly explained by the fact that some of the companies are inactive; they were only used to acquire the residence permit or were abandoned by an owner who preferred to move his or her capital to a new company due to immigration or tax problems. Still, the vast majority of Chinese in Hungary are owners or co-owners of a company, even if it consists only of a stall in a market.

Growth and consolidation of the ethnic economy

Chinese exports to Hungary reached their lowest ebb in 1992, after the setback suffered by the end of the command economy. They have been growing continuously ever since. For years, Hungary has been the biggest export partner of China in the region. In 2002 one-third of Chinese exports to Central Eastern Europe came to Hungary, which is attributed by the Chinese as well as the Hungarian government to the presence of Chinese merchants in Hungary (Lai 2003: 1, accessed 15 October 2003). This output also includes goods that are re-exported from Hungary; according to a

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7 The research was done within the framework of the research project NKFP 05/0084.
8 It appears from the answers that some respondents gave their original occupation in answering to the question on professional training (végzettség) and their present occupation to the question on occupation ( fogalkozás), others gave their field of education as answer to the first question and their occupation to the second, and so on. Consequently, answers to these questions show many overlaps, and they can be considered only as approximate data.
former chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Hungary, only 28% of imports remained in the country in 1994 (Li, Qiang 1996). Yet, according to an estimate, sales of Chinese consumer goods in Hungary reached as much as $300 million in 1997 (Karacs 1997), when, according to Hungarian data, the customs value of Chinese imports was $288 million. In 2002, according to Hungarian customs statistics, the value of imports exceeded two billion dollars, fifty times the value in 1992. The growth is, however, primarily caused not by the typical import goods of Chinese companies, but by the imports of spare parts of the multinational companies having assembling plants in Hungary, partly within the companies themselves (such as Nokia, Philips, Siemens, IGM, Flextronics, and Audi) since the mid-90s. The proportion of electronics parts had doubled to 40% according to Chinese data, or to 70-80% according to Hungarian data, by 2002. (Lai 2003: 1) According to Hungarian customs data, clothes, textiles and shoes imports were worth $646 million, or about one-third of all imports (42% according to Chinese data) in 2002, as contrasted to about 80% in 1994 (Lai 2003: 1). Nonetheless, even in this category of goods typical for Chinese importers, growth has been more than eightfold. According to the Scientific Association of Leather, Shoe and Leather Processing Industries, the imports of shoes from China and Hong Kong (which serves as entrepôt) nearly 30 million pairs in 2000, constituting almost three-fourths of the total import of shoes (Demeter 2002).

Successful Chinese entrepreneurs in Hungary have gradually moved from being market traders to being distributors (toboaohuang), and some have become importers (jahoushang). Importers usually acquire their goods from small manufacturers in the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong. The shoes usually come from Fujian, while goods from Guangdong are considered more expensive and of higher quality. A smaller number of migrant entrepreneurs have moved into industries related to the outsourcing set. Most of these have been employees of state foreign trading, shipping and other companies in Hungary, settled in the country after the approval of their companies to look for new market opportunities and to represent the company. For their employers, this meant not only a new market but also a reduction in personnel costs, as such employees were usually given a certain percentage of the income instead of salaries. Though officially their companies registered in Hungary were not owned by the mother company, they often traveled with a service passport and were considered employees of the mother company for a period of about two years. Afterwards, the relationship between the sending company and the agent gradually became looser. Many of these entrepreneurs did not return to China, but still enjoy the support of their former companies and uncertain advantages of belonging to it when they go home for a visit.

Exclusion, transnationalism, and the normativity of success

The concept of the “middleman minority” described by Turner and Bonacich (1980) covers such migrants who, relying on ethnic networks, build institutionalized positions in certain well-delineated niches of the economy. These networks are able to offer such goods and services by a flexible mobilization of labor, capital and business information that are locally not available, or only available at a higher price. As the routes of social mobility available to locals are closed to them, their livelihood depends on the ethnic economy; therefore they have to keep down costs in the interest of preserving their competitiveness. Due to this reason and because they are vulnerable, they are inclined to take up economic roles or apply methods that are considered deviant (“slave work”, “sea market”). As a result, the receiving society increasingly identifies the entire group with a particular economic niche and sees it as an economic threat. Though locals encounter the migrants daily, this usually happens in situations where the migrant is the seller and the locals are the customers, accentuating conflict rather than mitigating it. These migrants are not perceived as a part of local society but as familiar, useful, sometimes exotically interesting, but potentially dangerous strangers. Further aggravation by legal vulnerability, this situation deter the migrants from long-term financial or emotional investments.

Middlemen minorities are familiar from pre-modern Europe and colonial Southeast Asia and Africa. But they are not characteristic of post-war Western Europe with its strong social mobility, well-developed and- regulated networks of retail trade, and ban on discriminatory laws and practices. The new Chinese migrants in Eastern Europe, however, found themselves in an economic environment with dysfunctional networks of retail trade, often situated in the “grey economy”, undeveloped imports, and significant social and psychological barriers to local entrepreneurship. In the early nineties, Chinese migrants utilized scarcity in these countries, filling a market gap by selling cheap but popular clothing that had already been manufactured in China for low-price Western retail chains. As contrasted to traditional Chinese migrants in Western Europe, these migrants, thanks to their background, possessed the cultural capital, mobility, and connections to build close contacts with large state-owned companies in China that supplied them the necessary products at low, state-subsidized prices, under favorable conditions of credit.

Their extensive system of transnational contacts made it possible for the Chinese to rapidly and flexibly mobilize capital, goods and labor to satisfy market demand. The same system of contacts has simultaneously made it unnecessary for them to rely on locally accumulated cultural capital. They could afford not to bother about their peripheral position occupied in Hungarian society, and to follow instead the model of successful transnational entrepreneurs presented by the global Chinese media.


Li Qiang. 1996. "Huaid yijing zhuan yi lai" (Huaid has Moved) Zhongchou Shangbao (Budapest), February 19, 1-2, pp.


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Motivations and features of Hungarian immigration at the turn of the millennium

Following decades of isolation, Hungary after the social and political transformations in Eastern and Central Europe of the late 1980s, has re-entered the currents of international migration patterns, primarily as a destination country. The decade and a half that had passed since this turning point has revealed the fundamental feature of the new era: because of its geopolitical position and historical background, Hungary has become a destination country primarily for ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries. During the 1990s, two-thirds of all immigrants came to Hungary from neighboring countries—mainly states that used to be within the borders of Hungary before the end of World War I (46% of them came from Romania) and an overwhelming majority of them were of Hungarian ancestry.

According to data released by the Ministry of Interior, in 2001, 7,000 people from neighboring countries gained immigrant status in Hungary. 69.4% of them came from Romania, 17.7% from the Ukraine, 10% from (the former) Yugoslavia, 2.2% from Slovakia, and a negligible percentage from Croatia and Austria. Our survey, carried out among this immigrant population in the summer of 2002, is based on data from a representative sample of 1,015 people over the age of 18.16

Scrutinizing the purposes of migrating to Hungary, we found that only three-quarters of the respondents moved to Hungary with a view to settle, while 14% came to take on temporary employment and 8% moved across the border to study (see the pie chart).

It is difficult to find out retrospectively what percentage of the people in these latter two groups moved to Hungary with a long-term view to settle and what percentage decided to settle after they had set down roots in Hungary. But what we can definitely deduce from the data is that the “event nature” of a final crossing of the border with a view to settle, which characterized migratory movements in the former state socialist countries since 1990 is no longer a characteristic feature. Nowadays, settling in Hungary in many cases is preceded by periods of temporary stays to study or to work. The latest feature of European migratory processes—i.e. that the concepts of temporary and permanent migration are no longer sharply separable and in many cases permanent migration takes place gradually over time—is also applicable to Hungary (Sári, 2001).

There are differences between migrant groups coming from the various neighboring countries in terms of purposes: most people coming from Romania and the Ukraine arrive in Hungary with the intention to settle permanently (76.3% and 73.1% respectively) and most migrant workers come from these countries. As for Slovakia, the percentage of those who cross the border with the intention to study is significantly higher (22.6%) which also accounts for the low average age of this group. As for Yugoslavia, 12% came to Hungary with “other” aims which indicates the volume of migration, originally intended as temporary, due to the wars in the region (see diagram).

In the age group of over 55 most people come to Hungary with the aim of settling down (97%). Among younger groups, the percentage of those who originally envisioned a temporary stay is higher than the average (35%).

To explore the reasons for migration we devised two approaches to methodological considerations. Responses given to the open questions indicated that family reunification was the most frequent reason (32.1%) closely followed by economic reasons (29.8%). We regarded marriage as a reason independent of family reunification and it has been frequently (16.5%) mentioned as a reason for migration. The element of ethnicity-free use of the mother tongue, Hungarian identity—was mentioned by 17% as a reason for migration while 15.5% were motivated by worries over the future of their children.

However, it is also revealing to look at the reasons by country of origin as we will find significant differences here (Figure 3). While with migrants from Yugoslavia, the primary reasons were economic and worries over the future of the children, people coming from Romania and the Ukraine seemed to be primarily motivated by family reunification, though economic reasons also play a great part here. Migrants from Slovakia, who are significantly younger than the average, crossed the border to enter into marriage, while professional reasons and employment opportunities were also frequently cited. We have seen that political and general safety motivated migrants from Yugoslavia at a higher rate than people from other countries (16.8%), which phenomenon is clearly due to the wars in the region and the atrocities that followed them. Migratory motivations are different for the different age groups as well. Family reunification is almost the exclusive (78%) reason for those over 55 (25.4% of the sample), while those under 55 appear to be mostly motivated by economic reasons. Among people aged 18-34 (52% of the sample), the most frequently cited is economic reason, followed by marriage and professional reasons. The 35-54 age group (22.5% of the sample) cited the future and education opportunities of their children as the second most motivating factor after economic reasons.

Gender differences show that economic motivations—as well as political and general safety—appear to have mostly motivated men, while women cited marriage and family reunification at a higher frequency.

Applying the second method, that of closed questions which permitted 20 preset replies, has enabled us to compare our results in 14 of these categories with the findings of an earlier study15 and thus to demonstrate the main tendencies. (Figure 4)

In keeping with the responses given to the open-ended questions, it is apparent that reasons having to do with the economy have gained in significance between the two studies. This is no surprise considering the significant economic difference between Hungary and four of the neighboring countries (but especially Romania, the Ukraine, and Yugoslavia). Reasons such as the political situation, fear of mistreatment by the ethnic majority, human rights

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14 This survey carried out in 1995 constituted a somewhat different approach but was essentially similar in that it was performed among a population with immigrant status, though the people sampled in 1995 had already taken the next step and submitted citizenship applications in 1993. This seems to suggest that they had crossed the border years earlier, presumably during the great wave of migration around 1990.
violations and even the lack of Hungarian educational institutions are not so important reasons that they were in the early 1990s. Concern over the future cited as primary motivation seems to suggest that this is not just a reaction to a current political climate or the worse economic situation of the country of origin compared to Hungary, but that the bleakness of the future, the lack of prospects, also has to do with the motivations. Presumably, concern over the future is also economically charged and exacerbated by the fact that these people feel that as Hungarians (living in an ethnic minority in a given country) their economic prospects are even bleaker than that of the others. Many (30%) cited the rejection of the minority status as a reason for crossing the border.

Since the 1995 study, a significant increase can be observed in the family reunification category (35%) and the mention of the influence of friends, acquaintances, relatives (28%). This last category was cited less frequently among the responses given to the open questions, as compared to the closed ones which suggests that this factor was not an actual reason, but an important impulse in the decision to emigrate. On the one hand, the network of personal connections acts to convey patterns that could be followed and on the other hand, it also constitutes a resource, since relatives, acquaintances and friends who had migrated earlier could render significant help as sources of information and could reveal opportunities and generally make the initial period of adjustment easier. At the same time, nearly half of the respondents had a previous personal contact with migration through seeing a family member move to the same destination country. It is also observable that in the communities of origin, migration was an accepted and supported form of action. This understanding and support in the micro-environment must have provided a significant impetus to plans to migrate.

If we break down the reasons given to the closed questions by countries, we find that “improvement of one’s own living conditions and those of the family” was a dominant motivation for people coming from Romania (53.4%). At the same time, the lack of economic prospects seemed to motivate people migrating from the Ukraine the most. Unlike in the case of other countries, migrants from Yugoslavia cited “the hopelessness of the political situation” (37.3%) and “fear” due to acts of war and ethnic conflicts (23%).

It is also clear that while “family reunification” is an important reason for migrants from Romania and the Ukraine, this plays a lesser part for people coming from Yugoslavia. This indicates that people who migrated from Yugoslavia and gained an immigrant status in 2001 were really primary migrants\(^{17}\) while in the case of Romania and the Ukraine we have been witnessing the commencement of a significant secondary migration as well. The influence of the network of connections is also strongest in case of people from these two countries.

Even though the low number of cases should make us cautious in drawing conclusions, people from Slovakia seemed to be largely motivated by the intent to marry: over 50% of them cited this reason (which also explains their lower average age) but professional reasons were also often cited. Even though Slovaks cited the lack of economic prospects in their country the least frequently, they also seemed to feel uncertainty over their future and that of their children. The “lack of Hungarian educational institutions” was also an important factor in their decision to migrate, which obviously has to do with many of them (37.5%) having migrated to continue their secondary school studies in Hungary.

Thus the role of ethnicity cannot be ignored in the migratory processes under scrutiny. The relationship between the mother country and ethnic Hungarian communities was dominated by an extensive network of cross-border connections due to a shared historical background, shared ethnicity and mother tongue, even before the first large-volume migratory movements took place—which is especially true in the case of Romania. These networks of connections played an important role in setting off politically and economically motivated waves of migration—but they also become more dense due to the increased freedom of movement after the democratic transitions and contributed to maintaining the migratory processes. The increased education and employment opportunities in Hungary have also become migratory motivation and constituted migratory channels that were more accessible to people of Hungarian ethnicity.

The role of ethnicity as a factor of attraction manifested itself in the existence of connections in the destination country as well as in the attraction of the mother country with its culture and language—but also in the fact that language and ethnicity constitute convertible capital on the labor market (and other limited structures) of the host society. Ethnicity also motivates people to leave their country of origin once they experience ethnic tensions and conflicts as well as ethnic discrimination\(^{18}\) or reject their minority existence.

Finally, there is one more factor of migration worth mentioning: Hungary, for ethnic communities in neighboring countries, also constitutes the concept of the mother country which, besides national sentiments, also makes Hungary an economic, cultural and lifestyle reference point, a model to follow. The consciousness of “belonging to the same nation” defines the Hungarian nation within such a unified symbolic space, in which geographical movement towards “the center” is not primarily conceived as migration but as a potential channel of social mobility. This is why this migration, even though it also involves the crossing of borders, is in many ways different from the phenomenon of international migrations and can be situated somewhere between national and international migration in a peculiar interpretative framework which takes into consideration such aspects as historical roots, ethnic identity, cultural proximity and a shared language in the entire process.


\(^{17}\) Nearly two-thirds of them crossed the border over to Hungary before 1999.

\(^{18}\) Brubaker (1998) points out that in the case of ethnic Hungarian migrating to Hungary, ethnicity is not a capital as immediately convertible into citizenship as it is for the ethnic Germans migrating to Germany from various Eastern European countries.

\(^{*}\) The ratio of those who experienced discrimination on ethnic grounds in their homeland is significantly higher among those who migrated to Hungary than among those ethnic Hungarians surveyed in their countries of origin.
UN Convention and the protection of labor migrants in Hungary

On July 1st 2003, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (from now on Co UN) entered into force after reaching a threshold number of ratifying states in March 2003. The Co UN aims at protecting migrant workers. Its existence sets a moral standard and serves as a guide and stimulus for the promotion of migrant rights in each country.

The priority: the human rights of migrants

The major objective of the Co UN is to foster respect for migrants' human rights. Migrants are not only workers, they are also human beings. The Co UN does not create new rights for migrants but aims at guaranteeing equality of treatment and the same working conditions for migrants and nationals. This implies notably:

- preventing inhumane living and working conditions, physical and sexual abuse and degrading treatments (articles 10-11, 25, 54);
- guaranteeing rights to freedom of thought, expression and religion (articles 12-13);
- guaranteeing access to information on their rights (articles 33, 37);
- ensuring their right to legal equality, which implies that migrant workers are subject to fair procedures, have access to interpreting services and are not sentenced to disproportionate penalties such as expulsion (articles 16-20, 22);
- guaranteeing equal access to educational and social services (articles 27-28, 30, 43-45, 54);
- ensuring the right to participate in trade unions (articles 26, 40).

Migrants should also have the right to remain connected to their country of origin, says the Co UN. This implies ensuring:

- that migrants can return to their country of origin if they wish to and that they are allowed to pay occasional visits and are encouraged to maintain cultural links (articles 8, 31, 38);
- guaranteeing migrants' political participation in the country of origin (articles 41-42);
- ensuring migrants' right to transfer their earnings to their home country (articles 32, 46-48).

Why does not Hungary sign the Co UN?

Hungary has not signed Co UN and UNESCO has ordered an expert survey on the main arguments against signing Co UN. The main reasons given by migration policy experts are the following:

- The number of labor migrants is rather insignificant (a little more than 1% of the total population of the country);
- Hungary in principle does not encourage migration in-flow in its politics and does not want to increase the scale of present migration because the country takes a permanent in-flow of migrants from the neighboring countries who are ethnic Hungarians (more than 80% of migrants from the neighboring countries are ethnic Hungarians). Migrants from other (non-neighboring) countries are not encouraged at all.
- Experts do not predict a substantial in-flow of migrants from outside because of the difficult local language and because of absence of the special integrative programs (including favorable language training) for the migrants.
- For the experts migration is perceived mainly in the frame of Hungarian – Hungarian relations. Only one of the experts discussed the problem of Co UN ratification from the point of view of protection of Hungarians abroad as an argument to sign Co UN. The others perceived (perhaps, unconsciously) migration as the internal problem of the country in a perspective of a "former" empire.
- With the exception of its policy towards ethnic Hungarians, Hungary does not have a special migration policy, but follows the policy of the EU, the laws of which have priority in comparison with the other international laws. As Co UN is not included in the group of the documents, the signing of which is compulsory when joining EU. The experts do not think that this document will be signed in the near future.
- In the view of the experts, intergovernmental agreements on labor migration make it possible for Hungary to solve the problems of labor migration with success even without accepting Co UN.
- The fact that the majority of ethnic Hungarians from the neighboring countries have friends and relatives in Hungary, and migration networks exist between the neighboring countries and Hungary, all these circumstances contribute to the successful solution of the problem. The above migrants usually find low prestige jobs, but they successfully compete with the Roma in the Hungarian labor market.
- The special control for normal conditions of migrant life and rights, which were described in Co UN, are not supported by the financial possibilities within the country. At the same time, there are no organizations or parties in the country, which would be interested in lobbying for the Co UN ratification.

The expert survey confirmed that practically all the difficulties, fears and prejudices, which were mentioned in the UNESCO information kit (see: http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/) as arguments against signing the Co UN, also appear in the Hungarian society.

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